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Inside Cyber Warfare
Posted on August 1, 2010 by Editor
Review Essay by Jeffrey Barlow
This review of Jeffrey Carr’s work, Inside Cyber Warfare, follows upon our discussion in the
previous issue of Interface, “Cyber War and U.S. Policy: Part I, Neo-realism.” That piece was
informed in large part by a review of Richard A. Clarke and Robert Knake’s recent work, Cyber
War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It. The two books are on the
same topic, and the two reviews are intended to be complementary.
The works proceed, however, from different premises. While Clarke and Knake see the topic of
cyber war as related to earlier forms of warfare, they also see cyber war as demanding a very
different approach.
Carr in Inside Cyber Warfare sees continuities as more important than discontinuities. The work
relies, much more than did Clarke and Knake, upon models derived from earlier forms of warfare.
The distinction arises, I believe, because the two works are intended for substantially different
audiences, though clearly they overlap; the group concerned about cyber war is very large.
Clarke and Knake see cyber war as a policy problem. But for Carr, the problem is essentially a
military one. This may be in part because the group concerned with the threat of war in any
form, is, of course, the military establishment. Today’s high-ranking officers were trained for, and
are experienced in, kinetic warfare. Attempts to present cyber war as discontinuous and
requiring substantially new approaches are going to be less welcome than those which see it as
just a new “battle space.”
Clarke, however, is deeply suspicious of those in the American military who draw quick
comparisons to past war-fighting technologies in which cyber space is viewed simply as another
battlefield:
“…the U.S. military in general repeatedly characterizes cyberspace as something to be
dominated. It is reminiscent of the Pentagon’s way of speaking of nuclear war in the 1960s.
The historian of nuclear strategy Lawrence Freedman noted that William Kaufmann, Henry
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Kissinger, and other strategists realized that there was a need then “to calm the spirit of
offense, potent in Air Force circles…[whose] rhetoric encouraged a view of war that was out­
moded and dangerous.” That same sort of macho rhetoric is strong in Air Force cyber war
circles today, and apparently in the Navy as well [1].”
Jeffrey Carr is a “principal” at GreyLogic, a noted cyber security firm. Carr, and GreyLogic take a
hard line on issues related to cyber War [2]. While having a significant financial stake in the cyber
Security industry obviously does not disqualify an expert such as Carr from having a great deal to
say on the subject, it does expose him to charges of self-interest and subjectivity. There clearly is
a “cyber War industrial complex” already in existence, and there are billions to be made from
solving the problems presented by cyber conflicts, but also from exploiting, even creating, fears.
Some commentators have felt that at times the line between problem solving and exploitation
grows a bit unclear [3].
Carr’s credentials are first-rate; he consults frequently, publishes widely, and his access to insider
sorts of studies and information—some studies done at GreyLogic, others in various military and
think-tank venues. These provide Inside Cyber War with a great deal of urgency and credibility.
He is, in this area, a consummate insider. His publisher, O’Reilly Media, is noted for narrowly
focused expert analysis of a broad range of technical areas [4].
Another large difference between the two works is that Carr and his major sources reflect a sort
of mirror image to Clarke and Knake in that while they certainly were concerned with the
potentially violent impact of the Internet, their work focuses more on policy than on technology.
Carr’s work is very much based in a close analysis of technology and technologically enabled
opponents. Accordingly it largely treats solutions not as policy issues, but as technical ones facing
the defense establishment. This is both its strength, and its weakness.
The strengths of Inside Cyber Warfare, however, are many. The work analyzes many examples
of cyber conflicts. It also has very close analysis of the organizations and cyber conflict doctrines
of potential adversaries, to Carr, clearly China and Russia. While Clarke and Knake saw a large
part of the critical threat from cyber conflict to be a result of the wide dispersion of both tools and
motives for engaging in cyber attacks among highly varied non-state actors around the world,
Carr focuses upon potentially adversarial states.
While paying attention to criminal gangs and free-lance hackers, Carr sees the link between
nation states and their hackers to be the truly threatening issue. Carr’s material includes many
useful brief summaries of hacker gangs, their WWW locales, and even of individual hackers,
usually, of course, known by their on-line identities. These make fascinating reading and would
provide the interested reader with a great deal of material for their own research, though a great
deal of caution is in order in accessing some of the sites listed [5].
Carr’s grasp of technology is very strong and chapters 7-10 could well constitute a manual for
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white-hat hackers wishing to form a sort of counter-weight to the Russian criminal gangs and
Chinese citizens’ cyber militias which Carr sees as part of the strengths of those two potential
adversaries. Some of the content is quite dense and in addition to providing step-by-step
guidance to guarding against or tracking down threats, serves as an introduction to many useful
sites which will doubtless evolve to stay abreast of future developments in this field.
The book grows a bit labored at times. The author simply incorporates parts of a large
unpublished study by Lt. Cdr. Matthew Sklerov into chapter 4, and again into Chapter 13.
Chapter 4 deals with the concept of “active defense,” or what might fairly be termed immediate
retaliation or even preemptive strikes for cyber attacks presumed to be imminent.
The problem in active defense, however, is attribution. That is, how do we know who has
attacked? And even if we determine that an attack comes from say, China, how can we be
sure that it was launched by the Chinese government and not by an ultranationalist Chinese
teenager? Carr rather glosses over such issues, asserting that technological solutions and
“predictive intelligence” can ultimately determine perpetrators. Clark and Knake, however, see
this as a very difficult problem to be dealt with quite carefully in terms of policy.
The work itself, however, shows some of the problems raised in dealing with a potentially infinite
number of threats. For example, a state often presumed to be adversarial is China. But Carr’s
own materials on China do not give us a great deal of confidence in at least his own ability to
perform the snap-judgments necessary to respond to possible impending attacks on the part of
some unknown foe.
While Carr might be excused for such cultural lapses as a compete misunderstanding of the
Chinese system of names, in which family names come first and given names last, other
problems are more serious ones. To Carr, Hong Kong and China are sufficiently the same that a
threat from Hong Kong is one from China, and, presumably, vice-versa. This would astonish both
mainlanders and “Hong Kong Belongers,” each quite a distinct group.
And at pages 174-175 his analysis is at least laughable, if not downright racist. He takes an
ancient Chinese book of military stratagems and by drawing very far-fetched analogies makes
them warnings of potential Chinese evil intentions with regard to cyber war [6]. As Carr says, the
“36 stratagems…still plays a large role in shaping Beijing’s military strategy [7].” And don’t forget
the greatest of all Chinese criminal masterminds, Fu Manchu, either.
Skerlov, and by extension, Carr, after a great deal of logic-chopping on the former’s part, finesse
the problem of attribution by arguing that states are legally obliged to prevent cyber attacks [8],
and hence it would be legal to immediately attack that state [9]. This is, of course, given the
ability of teenagers to successfully launch cyber attacks upon the Pentagon from, say, a rural
area of Alabama, let alone a Chinese Internet café, rather strange reasoning.
This chain of reasoning also ends, as Clarke and Knake point out, in justifications under certain
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foreseeable circumstances for “kinetic responses”—i.e., conventional warfare attacks, given that
the U.S. is so much weaker on the defense than some of its potential opponents (because it has
so many more critical electronic sites to defend) and hence must rely on quick and violent
counter-attacks.
At the last I must agree with Clarke and Knake that while extrapolations from warfare in the
predigital age are useful, cyber conflicts are substantially new. Belabored attempts to face cyber
conflicts into the moulds of kinetic ones are more dangerous than enlightening.
On balance, this is a very useful book. It provides a hard-nosed counterpoint to anyone
suspecting that Clarke and Knake are ultimately appeasers, and a good insight into the very
widespread, perhaps dominant, Realist perspective on cyber conflicts. Anyone wishing to fully
understand cyber conflict and the various schools of thought on it should not neglect it. But it is
probably most useful not as a manual or a final statement on cyber war, but as a resource which
can open up a wide variety of sources and perspectives.
Endnotes
[1] Highlight Loc. 689-95, Kindle Edition, Clarke and Knake.
[2] For an understanding of GreyLogic’s perspective on questions related to cyber war, see their
WWW page at: http://greylogic.us/
[3] See a skeptical take on this issue see Robert X. Cringely, “The next cyber war will be for your
wallet” In InfoWorld, at: http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/030510-the-next-cyber-war-
will.html
[4] http://oreilly.com/
[5] If you are not already well aware of some of the potential consequences of visiting some web
pages, see our review of Nitesh Dhanjani’s work, Hacking: The Next Generation
[6] “Hide a knife behind a smile,” for example, is related to phishing schemes at p. 175, as is
“tossing a brick to get a jade gem.”
[7] p. 175
[8] pp. 62-68.
[9] See also Carr’s article “Projecting Borders into Cyberspace”
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